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Abstract
This paper discusses the role and effectiveness of redistributive
fiscal policies and provides estimates of the effects of taxation and
government expenditure on income inequality in Asia. Tax sys-
tems around the world tend to be progressive, but government
expenditure is generally found to be a more effective tool for re-
distributing income. In Asia, government spending on social pro-
tection has a distinctive differential distributive impact. Social
protection spending appears to increase income inequality in Asia,
whereas it reduces it in the rest of the world. Government ex-
penditure on housing is also adversely affecting the distribution of
income in Asia. Policy options for improving the redistributional
effectiveness of fiscal policies in Asia are discussed.
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades many countries in Asia have
experienced rapid economic growth, which has resulted in
a substantial reduction in poverty and a dramatic im-
provement in welfare and the standard of living for a large
proportion of the population. From 1990 to 2010 the re-
gion’s average per capita GDP in 2005 PPP terms rose
from US$ 1,633 to US$ 5,133, while the proportion of peo-
ple living on less than US$ 1.25 a day fell from around
54 percent to below 22 percent, lifting more than 715 mil-
lion people out of poverty (ADB 2012). But widening
income inequality is emerging as a concern as the
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performance in economic growth and reduction in poverty have been accompanied
with rising income disparity in several developing Asian countries. At the same
time, unequal access to basic social services, such as education and health, is seen as
a signiªcant problem that may be exacerbating growing income inequality.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of redistributive ªscal
policies in Asia, and compare that impact to what is observed in a broad set of other
countries outside the continent. More speciªcally, the paper analyzes the effective-
ness of taxation and selected government expenditure in reducing income inequal-
ity in Asia and in the rest of the world, and the ªscal policies that might be adopted
in Asian countries to help reduce income disparity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the
role and effectiveness of redistributive ªscal policies. Section 3 discusses empirical
estimates of the impact of taxation and government spending on income inequality
in Asia. Section 4 reviews how the effectiveness of ªscal policies in Asia may be im-
proved. The last section concludes with some policy lessons.
2. Review of the literature on the role and effectiveness of redistributive
ªscal policies
A great deal of research has gone into conceptualizing and measuring how the reve-
nue and expenditure sides of government budgets affect the distribution of income
among households and individuals and how effective they are in helping the poor.
Formally, the study of these effects is known as tax and expenditure incidence. This
section reviews the different approaches that have been used in the literature and
summarizes the main empirical ªndings.1
2.1 Tax incidence analysis
Tax incidence analysis investigates who ultimately bears the burden of government
taxes in an economy. There are several key concepts. First is the distinction between
“statutory” (or legal) incidence and “economic” incidence, or those taxpayers who
are by law required to pay the tax versus those taxpayers who ultimately bear the
tax burden. The latter is, of course, what really counts. The “shifting” of taxes hap-
pens because the agents statutorily responsible to pay the taxes can alter their eco-
nomic behavior and transfer or shift the burden of taxes to other agents via changes
in prices charged to consumers, wages paid to workers, or the return paid on invest-
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1 Some parts of this section draw on Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and Cuesta and Martinez-
Vazquez (2011).
ments. The degree of shifting depends on the elasticities of demand, supply, and
substitution in the use of inputs of production among the economic agents interact-
ing in the activity or market being taxed. Economic agents with lower elasticities—
that is, lower ability (or willingness) to react—are more likely to ultimately bear the
burden of taxes. Because adapting or reacting to taxes takes time, the economic inci-
dence of taxes tends to be different in the short and long run. For example, capital
owners may bear the burden of increased proªt taxes in the short run, but this bur-
den can be shifted to workers in the longer run as decreased investment leads to
lower productivity and wages, and higher unemployment.
Second, taxes impose total burdens that go beyond the amounts actually collected
by governments. This difference receives the name “excess burdens” of taxes or
“deadweight losses.” The excess burdens arise because taxes lead to less efªcient
uses of economic resources and lower output and income in the economy as taxes
distort the choices of economic agents. For example, income taxes affect labor–
leisure choices and saving and investment decisions.
Third, a signiªcant difªculty in measuring the impact of taxes is to ªgure out the
appropriate “counterfactual” (i.e., the situation before the taxes were implemented
that should be used as the benchmark in the measurement of the impact) and to ap-
proximate the distribution of income that would have taken place in that counter-
factual setting.
Fourth, to have a complete view of tax incidence we need to take into account the
impact of tax expenditures, negative income taxes, and in-kind transfers. Tax expen-
ditures, which take the form of exemptions, rebates, special deductions, tax credits,
and special lower tax rates, can make a tax system more progressive (i.e., increase
income equality) or more regressive (i.e., reduce income equality), depending on a
variety of public choice issues such as lobbying power. Moreover, an important con-
sideration is that tax expenditures cannot help the poor unless they pay taxes. And
many of the poor do not pay taxes. This point highlights some of the limitations of
redistributional policies from the tax side of the budget.
An important amount of redistribution can be implemented via negative taxes.
These cash transfers are targeted to the poor and are by nature highly progressive.
There are some caveats in their application, however. To minimize fraud, a sophisti-
cated tax administration is required. In addition, stigma among the recipients can
lead to low and uneven take-up of beneªts, which may affect the progressivity of
this type of transfer.
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For in-kind transfers, their incidence typically depends on the degree of participa-
tion by income groups. In-kind transfer programs such as food stamps tend to be
quite progressive. But not all in-kind transfer programs are progressive. For exam-
ple, voucher programs for higher education tend to beneªt higher income groups
more than lower income groups because their uptake of higher education typically
is proportionally higher, and so in general voucher programs are regressive.
2.2 Three general methodologies for determining the impact of taxes on
income distribution
Three approaches have been used to estimate the distributional impact of taxes. The
ªrst, and most widely used, is microsimulation analysis, which utilizes consumer or
household data and conventional assumptions of tax incidence. The second is based
on computable general equilibrium models for the entire economy and just a few
representative individuals, and the third is based on econometric estimation models
with more aggregate data.
Microsimulation models of tax incidence These models allocate tax burdens to
different income groups, ordered from rich to poor by deciles or quintiles of the
population, on the basis of a series of assumptions about who bears the ªnal burden
of taxes. For each tax, a portion of the revenues collected is imputed as tax burden to
each income group in a way that exhausts the total revenues collected. For example,
the revenues from excise taxes on tobacco products are allocated to different income
groups in proportion to their relative share in the consumption of tobacco products.
To arrive at an estimate of the incidence for the entire tax system, the incidence for
each tax is calculated separately for each income group. These results are added up
across all taxes for each income group to arrive at the total burden for each income
group. Typically, the total burden is expressed as an average total tax rate—that is,
the proportion of income paid in taxes by each income group. The information on
total income, sources of income, and expenditure patterns are generally obtained
from data in household or consumer income and expenditure surveys. Taxes col-
lected are obtained from the tax administration authorities.
The microsimulation approach to tax incidence presents advantages and disadvan-
tages. On the plus side, the methodology is relatively simple and easy to implement,
the underlying assumptions are transparent, and the implications of alternative as-
sumptions can be easily compared. The analysis can also include large samples of
taxpayers. On the minus side, good information on income distribution is not al-
ways available, and general equilibrium second-round feedback effects are typically
ignored. More importantly, the assumptions about who bears the ªnal burden of
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taxes that play a critical role in the results have been criticized for “stipulating” the
incidence of various taxes (Devarajan, Fullerton, and Musgrave 1980).
General equilibrium models of tax incidence This approach to tax incidence was
pioneered by Harberger (1962). It analyzes the incidence of taxes within the context
of a general equilibrium model of the economy, without making explicit assump-
tions about who bears the ªnal burden of taxes. Instead, tax incidence is determined
by the initial structure of the economy with the ªnal outcome measured by observ-
ing the differences in the vector of equilibrium prices before and after a tax change.
Harberger’s model was operationalized by the development of computable general
equilibrium models. They are numerically solved general equilibrium models using
data from the national income accounts, household expenditure surveys and tax-
payer ªlings (e.g., Fullerton et al. 1979; Ballard et al. 1985). General equilibrium
models capture all the parameters that should play a role in ªnal tax incidence
among different income groups: different demand patterns, different endowments
in resources, and variations in capital–labor ratios in different economic sectors.
The general equilibrium approach also has its advantages and disadvantages. On
the positive side, it uses an explicit structural model of the economy with utility/
demand functions and production/supply functions. It offers transparency in how
incidence results are linked to assumptions on fundamental parameters, such as the
elasticity of substitution in production and the incidence results include measures of
excess burdens. Moreover, general equilibrium models take into account indirect or
second-round feedback effects of taxation or government expenditure changes. On
the minus side, general equilibrium models are operationally intensive and the
number of taxpayers represented needs to be small. And even though the approach
does not stipulate incidence results it does stipulate a long list of critical parameters,
including elasticities of substitution in production and demand and supply
(Fullerton and Rogers 1991).
Regression-based estimates of the impact of taxes on income distribution
A limited number of recent studies have used multivariate econometric analysis to
investigate the impact of the tax structure on the distribution of income across coun-
tries, typically measured via Gini coefªcients. For example, Weller (2007) uses cross-
country data from 1981 to 2002 and ªnds positive effects of progressive taxation on
income distribution. Gwartney and Lawson (2006) use panel data on changes in
marginal tax rates from 1980 to 2002 to examine their impact on the distribution of
income and ªnd that countries with the most signiªcantly high tax brackets rate
reductions have experienced the largest increases in inequality over the sample
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period. Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) derive a measure of income tax
progressivity and ªnd that inequality in the distribution of income is signiªcantly
affected by their measure of progressivity. Similarly, Martinez-Vazquez, Vulovic, and
Liu (2011) ªnd that higher reliance on direct over indirect taxes improves the income
distribution over time for a large number of countries.
On the plus side, the econometric approach allows analyzing the impact of large
variations in the level and structure of taxes across countries, variations that are un-
likely observed within a single economy. Moreover, it has fewer data requirements
than the microsimulation and general equilibrium approaches and uses information
typically available for most countries including developing economies. A disadvan-
tage of the approach, however, is that the impact of the different elements of the
structure of taxes on income distribution cannot be examined in any detail, at least
not to the extent allowed by the general equilibrium approach and especially micro-
simulation models. In all, the econometric approach should therefore be considered
a complement rather than a substitute for the other two approaches.
2.3 Expenditure incidence analysis
From the perspective of redistributional policies, it is important to understand the
incidence of public spending programs. The key difªculty in measuring the impact
of public expenditure on individuals and households, however, is that with some
rare exceptions, we are not able to measure output from government expenditures.
How public expenditures impact different groups depends, among other things, on
the composition of public expenditures, what programs are being implemented, and
how much funding is going to each, such as basic education versus university-level
education, or primary health care versus tertiary hospitals. The impact of public ex-
penditure on the distribution of income depends also on the efªciency of govern-
ment spending, the cost effectiveness of funds in delivering services, and the match-
ing of real needs.
The basic problem in expenditure incidence is how to measure the beneªts accruing
to individuals from public goods and services. In the case of private goods and ser-
vices, even though marginal private beneªts are not directly observable we can infer
them from market prices. In the case of public goods and services, many are pro-
vided without direct charges, and even when there is a fee or service charge, this
price cannot be interpreted in general as the marginal beneªt for individuals, be-
cause the supply of most public goods and services is subsidized or rationed, and it
does not respond directly to demand.
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2.4 Three general methodologies for determining the impact of government
expenditures on income distribution
Three general approaches have been used in the estimation of expenditure inci-
dence. The ªrst is the beneªt incidence approach, which measures how much the in-
come of households or individuals would have to be raised if they had to pay for
subsidized public goods and services at full cost. The second is the behavioral ap-
proach, which derives estimates of households’ and individuals’ willingness to pay
for those goods and services. The third approach uses econometric techniques with
aggregate data to analyze their differential impact on income distribution.
The beneªt incidence approach This approach, which is also known as the clas-
sic or the nonbehavioral approach, was pioneered by twin World Bank studies by
Selowsky (1979) for Colombia and Meerman (1979) for Malaysia. The essence of the
approach is to use information on the cost of publicly provided goods and services
together with information on their uses by different income groups to arrive at esti-
mates of the distribution of beneªts. Individual beneªciaries are typically grouped
by income level, but they can also be grouped by geographical area, ethnic group,
urban and rural location, gender, and so on. Information on individual or household
use of the public goods and services is typically obtained from surveys, and it is
fundamental to know how effectively public expenditure programs target the poor.
Because of the required information on unit costs in the provision of public goods
and services and the rate of use of those services by different individuals, in prac-
tice, beneªt incidence has been estimated for three main categories of public goods
and services: education, health, and some types of infrastructure.
The beneªt incidence approach has several strengths but it also has weaknesses. On
the positive side, it provides simplicity and transparency of estimation procedures
and allows study of which public expenditure programs are most effective in reach-
ing and improving the status of the poor. On the negative side, the cost measures
may not be a good enough approximation of true beneªts or marginal valuations of
the public good or service provided, and it cannot incorporate changes in the behav-
ior of individuals in response to changes in public expenditure. For example, we
may ªnd that poor households do not send their children to school, but beneªt inci-
dence cannot explain why that may be the case, nor does it provide a course of pol-
icy action. Moreover, the scope is limited to public expenditure programs for which
private beneªciaries can be identiªed. The approach can also ignore important inter-
action effects with the private sector. For example, if the private education sector is
able to attract a higher number of wealthier students, the beneªt incidence of public
education becomes more progressive. On the other hand, if the quality of education
depends, among other things, on peer effects, the lower number of children of better
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educated and wealthier families in public schools may reduce the quality of public
education for the poor.
The behavioral approach: Marginal willingness to pay In essence, this approach
uses individual preferences to derive marginal willingness to pay as the measure of
individual beneªts from public expenditures. This approach was ªrst used in the es-
timation of net ªscal incidence of taxes and expenditures at the local level by Aaron
and McGuire (1970) and Martinez-Vazquez (1982) and more recently in expenditure
incidence studies pioneered by Gertler and van der Gaag (1990), Gertler and
Glewwe (1990), and Younger (1999). Econometric methods are used to exploit varia-
tion in behaviors in the use of public goods and services, prices, incomes, and other
household characteristics across individuals, and time to estimate demand functions
for public goods and services. These demand functions generate price elasticities
and willingness to pay, generally varying by income group. With that information,
one can estimate the incidence of public spending programs, in particular whether
they have a pro-poor incidence and whether the poor may have a more elastic re-
sponse to any changes in costs associated with the use of the public good or service.
The behavioral approach also has several strengths and weaknesses. On the positive
side, it is more theoretically sound with clear foundations in microeconomics, and
allows the estimation of incidence for public expenditures for which speciªc users
cannot be identiªed. Furthermore, it incorporates individual behavioral responses
and therefore can provide concrete guidance for policy reform to better target ex-
penditures to the poor. On the negative side, this approach is more data-intensive
and methodologically more complex.
Regression-based estimates of the impact of government expenditures on in-
come distribution Using cross-country or panel data, this approach investigates
the impact of government expenditures on the distribution of income, typically
measured via Gini coefªcients. Regression-based estimates, going as far back as
Tanzi (1974), have shown that what in many instances would seemingly be per-
ceived as redistributive government spending may do nothing to improve income
inequality and may actually worsen it. For example, de Mello and Tiongson (2006)
in a cross-country analysis (the sample running from 27 to 56 countries depending
on availability of data) of the impact of government spending on income distribu-
tion ªnd the overall effects of expenditures to be unequalizing. In fact, those
countries where redistribution is most needed due to high inequality are also less
likely to have effective redistributive policies in place. In a country case study for
Brazil, Clements (1997) similarly ªnds that government social expenditures have in
fact exacerbated income inequality. On the other hand, Jao (2000) ªnds that in the
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case of Taipai, China, public expenditures on social assistance and social insurance
contributed positively to reducing income inequality. Using panel data for a large
number of countries, Martinez-Vazquez, Moreno-Dodson, and Vulovic (2012) ªnd
that aggregate public expenditures on social welfare, education, health, and housing
have a signiªcant effect on reducing income inequality.2
The multivariate regression approach to the analysis of public expenditure inci-
dence also has some clear advantages and disadvantages, and therefore should be
considered a complement rather than a substitute for the beneªt incidence and be-
havioral approaches. It can analyze the impact on income distribution of large varia-
tions in levels of expenditures and their composition across countries, variations
that are often not observed within the context of country case studies. Multivariate
analysis also allows examining the evolution over time of the impact of different
government expenditures on income distribution within countries, and is less data-
intensive. On the other hand, the analysis of income distribution at the aggregate
country level does not allow the introduction in the analysis of speciªc details of
policies and institutions that can make a signiªcant difference on the effectiveness
and overall impact of public expenditure policies. For example, two countries can
have similar expenditures on primary education and health, but one of these coun-
tries may put greater effort into targeting the access to these services by poor rural
or urban families. This type of information is typically not available for a large num-
ber of countries and therefore is likely to be ignored in multivariate regression stud-
ies. If the information is available, there may be the possibility of using dummy
variables to account for those effects. Also, to the extent that institutions and policy
approaches do not change over time, their impact can be controlled for by using
ªxed-effect panel estimation.
2.5 Summary of ªndings of incidence analysis
Although different tools and data have been used in the incidence literature, some
general results and ªndings about the effectiveness of redistributive ªscal policies
seem to hold across the different methodological approaches.
Most tax systems tend to show a mildly progressive incidence impact. Around the
world, however, taxes have not been an effective means of redistributing income.
This is partly because of the potentially large excess burdens or economic losses as-
sociated with highly progressive taxation. The international experience shows that
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2 The data set covers a slightly shorter period, 1970–2006, than the one used in this study for
which the results are reported in the next section. The estimation also does not differentiate
Asian economies.
the expenditure side of the budget (including transfers) can have a more signiªcant
impact on income distribution. Direct cash transfers and in-kind transfers can be
quite progressive, unless there are serious targeting problems. Moreover, expendi-
ture programs in the social sectors (education and health) are more progressive
the more is spent in relative and absolute terms on those goods and services more
frequently used by the poor (basic education and primary health care). The effec-
tive targeting to lower income groups in expenditure programs is hard to design
and to implement, however. Whether these general ªndings and conclusions about
the effectiveness of redistributive ªscal policies also hold for Asian countries is
discussed next.
3. Empirical estimates of the impact of ªscal policies on income inequality
in Asia
This section presents estimates of the impact of ªscal policies on income inequality
in Asia. They are derived from multivariate regression analysis and quantify the ef-
fects of taxation and selected government expenditures on income distributions.
3.1 Methodology and data
Using data from 150 developed, developing, and transition economies between 1970
and 2009, Claus, Martinez-Vazquez, and Vulovic (2012) estimate the impact of ªscal
policies on income distributions measured by Gini coefªcients.3 Of the 150 econo-
mies, 22 are from Asia.4 To identify Asia-speciªc tax and government expenditure
effects, dummy variables are used. Different regressions are estimated to assess
the effects of taxes and government expenditures individually and jointly using
ªxed-effect panel estimation methodology proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).
All regressions include lagged inequality to capture the persistence of income in-
equality over time, various tax and government expenditure variables, and a set of
observable control variables that are commonly used in the literature to explain in-
come inequality. Based on data availability, the following control variables are
included: population growth, youth dependency, old-age dependency, a globaliza-
tion index, GDP per capita, long-term unemployment, perception of corruption,
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3 Gochoco-Bautista et al. (2013) examine the relationship between income inequality and in-
come polarization in Asian countries.
4 Economies in Asia included are Bangladesh; Bhutan; Cambodia; the People’s Republic of
China; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic; Macao, China; Malaysia; the Maldives; Mongolia; Myanmar; Nepal;
Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; and Vietnam.
schooling, and size of government. The estimations also include dummy variables
to account for differences in the computation of Gini coefªcients across countries.5
The following tax variables are considered: personal income tax, corporate income
tax, social security contributions and payroll taxes, general taxes on goods and ser-
vices, and excises and customs duties—all measured as a percent of GDP.
Personal income taxes are generally thought to reduce income inequality. When
evaluating their impact on income disparity, however, it is important to take into ac-
count the progressivity of income tax scales (i.e., how fast the average tax rate rises
with income). As a result, personal income tax revenue is interacted with a compre-
hensive personal income tax progressivity measure (progressivity) constructed by
Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010).
When assessing the impact of corporate income taxes on inequality, it is important
to take into account that the progressivity of corporate income taxes may be affected
by countries’ openness. In a closed economy, the owners of capital tend to bear the
full burden of corporate income taxes. But in an open economy, where capital can
ºow freely across international borders, the burden of corporate income taxes is
likely to be shifted to workers. To allow for these effects, the corporate income tax
variable is interacted with a globalization index.
Social security contributions and payroll taxes are commonly shared between em-
ployees and employers. But employers tend to almost entirely shift the burden to
employees in the form of lower wages. Social security contributions and payroll
taxes are expected to increase income inequality if there is a cap on income for con-
tribution. The lower the cap, the more regressive are the taxes.
The evidence for the impact of taxes on goods and services, including value-added
taxes and excises, on income inequality is mixed. Studies that analyze current in-
come generally ªnd that they are regressive, but this regressivity is reduced substan-
tially and may even become neutral when analyzed over a longer time frame. The
sign on the coefªcient for general taxes on goods and services and excises could
therefore be negative or not signiªcantly different from zero. For lack of better infor-
mation, customs duties are expected to have the same direction of effect on income
inequality as general taxes on goods and services.
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5 Gini coefªcients are computed from income/consumption distribution data. They can be
based on gross or net income (i.e., income before or after the deduction of taxes and social
contributions) or expenditure.
On the government spending side, four types of expenditure are considered: on so-
cial protection, education, health, and housing—all expressed as a percent of GDP.
Ideally, subcomponents of these expenditure categories would have been included
(e.g., basic education versus university-level education, or primary health care ver-
sus tertiary hospitals), as they are likely to affect income groups differently. Interna-
tionally comparable disaggregated data on government spending are not available,
however. Bearing this in mind, it is possible that higher aggregate government
spending may in fact increase income inequality (e.g., in the case where that expen-
diture is directed toward higher education), even though the intuitive expectation is
that it would reduce it.
The empirical analysis consists of three sets of estimation. The ªrst set focuses only
on the effects of taxation and personal income tax progressivity on income inequal-
ity. Similarly, the second set of estimates investigates only the effects of government
spending on income distributions, and the third set includes both taxation and gov-
ernment expenditure to evaluate their joint effect on income inequality in Asia and
other countries. The results from the ªrst two sets of estimation are replicated in
Appendices A and B and discussed next. Those from the joint estimation are not
replicated as they conªrm the general ªndings. For a detailed description of the data
and methodology and the results from the joint estimation see Claus, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Vulovic (2012).
3.2 Taxation and income inequality
Table 1 reports the estimated marginal impact of taxation on income inequality from
alternative tax instruments. Table 1 shows that personal income taxes (PIT) have the
expected negative impact on income inequality and that the effect is signiªcantly
higher in Asia than in the rest of the world. A one-percentage-point increase in PIT
revenue as a percent of GDP in Asia reduces income inequality by around 0.573 per-
centage points compared with 0.041 percentage points in the rest of the world. The
ªnding of a greater redistributive effect of personal income taxation may be due to
a larger number of people not paying income tax in Asia because their income is
below a tax-free threshold. A larger share of informal employment may also be a
contributing factor.
The overall impact of progressive income tax scales is modest and somewhat
smaller in Asia than in the rest of the world. A one-percentage-point increase in PIT
interacted with the progressivity measure reduces income inequality by around
0.002 percentage points in Asia compared to 0.005 in the rest of the world.
Including corporate income tax (CIT) revenue as a percent of GDP in the estimation
suggests that corporate income taxation reduces income disparity in the rest of the
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world, but that it is regressive in Asia.6 A one-percentage-point increase in CIT
raises income inequality by around 0.598 percentage points. This regressivity of
CIT in Asia may be due to larger tax concessions and subsidies for ªrms. Interact-
ing CIT with globalization, however, reverses the sign. CIT interacted with global-
ization lowers inequality, which is the opposite from what is expected and what is
observed in the rest of the world. The ªnding may be due to proªt shifting by multi-
national corporations to Asian countries.
Social security contributions and payroll taxes are typically shifted to employees in
the form of lower wages and are expected to result in increased income inequality
when capped at higher incomes. The results in Table 1 provide support for this hy-
pothesis, especially in Asia where the estimated effect of social security contribu-
tions and payroll taxes as a percent of GDP (SSCPayroll) on income inequality is
substantially larger than in the rest of the world (1.324 compared with 0.165). The
larger coefªcient in Asia is likely due to two effects. First, social security contribu-
tions are capped at relatively low incomes. Second, they are deductible for income
tax purposes in several Asian countries, which raises the tax burden for low income
people with earnings below a tax-free threshold.
Empirical evidence regarding the effect of general taxes on goods and services on in-
come inequality is mixed. The results for Asia and for the rest of the world support
the hypothesis that they are regressive. The results suggest that a one-percentage-
point increase in general taxes on goods and services as a percent of GDP (GTGS) in-
creases income inequality by around 0.666 percentage points in Asia compared with
0.768 in the rest of the world. Somewhat less regressive GTGS could be due to lower
tax compliance in Asia. Moreover, Asia may have a greater number of small busi-
nesses not charging value-added taxes (VAT), for example, because their sales are
below VAT registration thresholds.
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6 The correlation coefªcient between the Gini coefªcient and CIT in Asia is about 0.06.
Table 1. Estimated marginal impact of taxation on income inequality (in percentage points)
Asia Rest of the world
Personal income tax 0.573 0.041
Personal income tax*progressivity 0.002 0.005
Corporate income tax 0.598 0.338
Corporate income tax*globalization 0.017 0.005
Social security and payroll taxes 1.324 0.165
General taxes on goods and services 0.666 0.768
Excises 0.609 0.059
Customs duties 0.174 0.651
Source: Claus, Martinez-Vazquez, and Vulovic (2012).
Excises and customs duties are also found to be regressive in Asia. The results in
Table 1 show an estimated effect of 0.609 percentage points for excises and 0.174 per-
centage points for customs duties.
3.3 Government spending and income inequality
Table 2 reports the estimated marginal impact of the different types of government
spending on income inequality. The estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point
increase in social protection expenditure raises income inequality in Asia by
0.49 percentage points. In the rest of the world, social protection spending has the
expected negative sign (i.e., it reduces income inequality).
Social protection expenditures consist of two components: (i) services and transfers
provided to individuals and households, and (ii) expenditures on services provided
on a collective basis (IMF 2001). Collective social protection services include formu-
lation and administration of government policy, formulation and enforcement of
legislation and standards for providing social protection, and applied research and
experimental development into social protection services. Asian countries provide
relatively few services and transfers, and the second component is likely to domi-
nate. The unexpected positive effect of social protection on income inequality sug-
gests that government policies and legislative enforcement, and so forth—the sec-
ond component of social protection expenditure—may beneªt higher-income
households and individuals more than those with a lower income.7 Moreover, the
unexpected positive effect of social protection may be due to a narrow beneªt cover-
age and a lack of targeting to the poor for the few services and transfers that Asian
countries provide.
For education, the results suggest that government expenditures in Asia have a
larger negative effect on income inequality than education spending in other coun-
tries. In the case of expenditures on health, this type of expenditure has a somewhat
lower negative effect on income inequality in Asia than in the rest of the world. On
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7 To test this hypothesis, information on the structure of social protection expenditures would
be needed, which, however, is not available.
Table 2. Estimated marginal impact of government spending on income inequality
(in percentage points)
Asia Rest of the world
Social protection 0.490 0.276
Education 0.486 0.034
Health 0.241 0.330
Housing 2.162 0.614
Source: Claus, Martinez-Vazquez, and Vulovic (2012).
the other hand, the estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in hous-
ing expenditure raises income inequality in Asia by 2.162 percentage points, com-
pared with the rest of the world where housing spending has the expected negative
sign (i.e., it tends to reduce income inequality). The adverse effect likely reºects the
housing challenges facing governments in developing Asia that are arising from
rapid urbanization. So far, large-scale government programs of direct housing pro-
vision have only been successful in a few countries (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore)
and nearly a third of households in Asia continue to live in slums and informal set-
tlements (UN-HABITAT 2011).
4. Improving the effectiveness of ªscal policies in Asia
The review of the literature and the empirical results for Asia and the rest of the
world suggest that more effective redistributional policies can be implemented with
spending programs on social welfare and the social sectors, such as health and edu-
cation policies, than with taxes. Taxation, however, is crucial to raise ªnancing for
government expenditure to achieve distributional objectives. This section discusses
the effectiveness of tax systems and tax administration in collecting tax revenue in
Asia. Our focus is on corporate and personal income taxation and value-added
taxes, as payroll and social security taxes are less important in Asian countries and
tax revenues from foreign trade taxes, including custom duties, are declining with
rising trade liberalization. The section also brieºy discusses government spending
policies on education, health, and social protection to throw more light on the em-
pirical ªndings presented in the previous section. Housing is excluded from the dis-
cussion because of a lack of readily available data and information.
4.1 Tax systems
Taxes create economic costs because they distort economic behavior. A theoretically
optimal tax that minimizes the behavioral impact of taxation is one that taxes activi-
ties according to their varying response elasticities to the tax. In practice, however,
such an approach is not feasible because it is constrained by principles of fairness
and simplicity, and because of the difªculties to reliably measure the tax sensitivity
of particular activities. Practically speaking, an efªcient tax system is one that re-
duces the disincentive effects of taxation to work, save, and invest by using broad
bases and low, fairly uniform rates. A broad-base, low-rate system also lowers ad-
ministration and compliance costs, leaving more resources for productive activities,
and is often seen as fairer than a narrow-base system because of horizontal equity
considerations (i.e., taxpayers who have the same income should pay the same
amount in taxes) and vertical equity (i.e., people with different incomes should pay
different amounts of tax).
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4.2 Composition of taxes
Corporate income taxation is an important part of countries’ tax systems. Figure 1
plots corporate income tax revenue as a percent of GDP and (statutory) corporate in-
come tax rates in Asia compared with three country averages: all countries, OECD
countries, and developing countries excluding those in Asia. It shows that Malaysia
at 8.1 percent and Vietnam at 7.7 percent have the highest level of CIT, and Indone-
sia, Cambodia, and Bangladesh have the lowest, at 1.0 percent, 0.9 percent, and
0.7 percent, respectively. Corporate tax collection is low in Indonesia and Bangla-
desh despite relatively high tax rates, partly because of various tax incentives and
concessions that governments often provide for attracting investment and for activi-
ties seen as having social or economic merit.
Besides reducing tax revenue collections, there are other potential costs to tax incen-
tive schemes. Tax incentives often become politicized with resources being captured
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Figure 1. Corporate income tax and corporate income tax rate (2009 or latest available year)
Source: International Monetary Fund, KPMG, OECD, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Note: Sorted from highest to lowest tax revenue as a percent of GDP.
*Unweighted average.
GDP gross domestic product; OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; PRC People’s Republic
of China.
by interest groups. If lobbying power is concentrated among high-income groups,
tax incentives and concessions would be expected to reduce the redistributive im-
pact of corporate income taxation. Another difªculty with tax incentives schemes is
that they are often poorly targeted and to a large extent just subsidize activities that
ªrms would have undertaken regardless of the policies.
Personal income taxation is another important part of countries’ tax collection.
Figure 2 plots personal income tax revenue as a percent of GDP and the top personal
(statutory) marginal income tax rate. It shows that PIT collection is low in Asia com-
pared with the rest of the world, OECD countries, and developing economies ex-
cluding those in Asia. On average, Asian countries collect about 2.2 percent of per-
sonal income taxes as a percent of GDP compared with an all-country average of
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Figure 2. Personal income tax and top personal marginal income tax rate (2009 or latest
available year)
Source: International Monetary Fund, KPMG, OECD, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Note: Sorted from highest to lowest tax revenue as a percent of GDP.
*Unweighted average.
GDP gross domestic product; OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; PRC People’s Republic
of China.
5.2 percent, and 8.8 percent, and 2.7 percent, respectively, in OECD and developing
countries excluding those in Asia. Partly contributing to this relatively low tax take
are higher tax-free (minimum exempt) thresholds and a higher threshold of income,
above which the top marginal personal income tax rate applies.
Figure 3 plots the ratio of the tax-free threshold/individual allowance or deduction
to gross national income per capita. It shows that Nepal at 3.8 and Pakistan at 3.95
have the highest ratios. Only Cambodia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan have ra-
tios below the average of OECD countries. The higher the tax-free threshold, the
larger tends to be the number of lower-income people exempt from income taxation
and the larger the redistributive impact of personal income taxes, but the higher the
statutory tax rates that are needed to ªnance government expenditure.
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Figure 3. Ratio of tax free threshold/individual allowance or deduction to gross national
income per capita (2012)
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Asian Development Bank, authors’ calculations.
Note: Gross national income per capita for Asian countries is assumed to grow at the 2000–10 rates.
*Unweighted average, data are for 2009 or 2008, no data are available for Turkey.
Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic; OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; PRC People’s
Republic of China.
Figure 4 plots the ratio of the top personal income tax threshold to per capita gross
national income. At 0.45, Hong Kong, China, has the lowest ratio, and the Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic, Vietnam, and Pakistan have the highest thresholds with
ratios of 38.8, 44.4, and 56.7, respectively. A higher threshold, all else equal, would
be expected to increase the redistributive impact of personal income taxes.
Also contributing to the relatively low personal income tax take in some Asian
countries are narrow tax bases, which exempt certain types of income or tax them at
lower rates. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for example, only certain listed
types of income (11 categories) are liable to tax. Some of these categories are taxed at
progressive rates, whereas others are taxed at a ºat rate. For labor income, wages
and salaries are taxed at a progressive rate with a top marginal rate of 45 percent,
but the remuneration of personal services is taxed at a ºat rate of 20 percent after a
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Figure 4. Ratio of top personal income tax threshold to gross national income
per capita (2012)
Source: Asian Development Bank, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, OECD, authors’ calculations.
Note: Gross national income per capita for Asian countries is assumed to grow at 2000–10 rates.
*Unweighted average, data are for 2009 or 2008, no data are available for Turkey.
Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic; OECD Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development; PRC People’s
Republic of China.
deduction of 20 percent of the payment as deemed expense. Interest is also gener-
ally taxed at a ºat rate (20 percent), whereas royalties and rental and lease income
are taxed at 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively, with a 20 percent deduction be-
ing allowed. Moreover, certain types of income (e.g., monetary awards, interest on
government bonds and on savings in a deposit account with banks in the PRC) and
certain beneªts in-kind (e.g., provision of or reimbursement for reasonable expenses
on accommodation, travel expenses, and allowances for children’s education) are
exempt from personal income taxation altogether. Tax concessions reduce the redis-
tributive impact of personal income taxes if they are mainly captured by higher-
income people.
A further important contributor to countries’ tax collection is general taxes on goods
and services, which include value-added (goods and services) taxes, general sales
taxes, and turnover taxes. They are plotted in Figure 5 as a percent of GDP together
20 Asian Economic Papers
Coping with Rising Inequality in Asia
Figure 5. General taxes on goods and services and indirect tax rate
(2009 or latest available year)
Source: International Monetary Fund, KPMG, OECD, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Note: Sorted from highest to lowest tax revenue as a percent of GDP.
*Unweighted average.
GDP gross domestic product; OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; PRC People’s Republic
of China.
with countries’ indirect tax rate, which generally coincides with the VAT standard
rate. The ªgure shows that revenues from general taxes on goods and services, simi-
lar to personal income taxes, are low in Asia, averaging 3.3 percent of GDP com-
pared with an all-country average of 6.4 percent, and 6.9 percent and 6.6 percent,
respectively, in developing countries excluding those in Asia and the OECD econo-
mies. This lower tax take partly results from lower indirect tax rates. Among Asian
countries, Japan and Singapore, both at 5 percent, and Thailand, at 7 percent, have
some of the lowest indirect tax rates in the world.
At 2.2 percent of GDP, the Philippines has the lowest collection of general taxes on
goods and services (consisting of VAT) despite its 12 percent indirect tax rate. The
low VAT revenues are largely due to a low efªciency of the VAT system. An
efªciency ratio, plotted in Figure 6, can be calculated as VAT revenues to GDP di-
vided by the standard statutory VAT rate (expressed as a percentage). A low
efªciency ratio is taken as evidence of erosion by exemptions, reduced rates within
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Figure 6. VAT efªciency ratio (2009 or latest available year, percent)
Source: International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Department of Statistics Singapore, authors’ calculations.
Note: PRC People’s Republic of China; VAT value-added tax.
the tax law, and/or low taxpayer compliance. Bangladesh has the second least
efªcient VAT system in Asia.
Singapore also has a relatively low efªciency given the breadth of its VAT base, re-
sulting from an extremely high registration threshold of annual taxable turnover
above SG$ 1 million or about US$ 620,000 (Figure 7).
Although the number of countries with a VAT system has been rising rapidly
(Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2011), several Asian economies have not adopted a
VAT. They include Bhutan; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Malaysia; and
Myanmar. India also does not have a VAT in the traditional sense.
Less reliance on value-added taxes in Asian countries is likely to increase the eco-
nomic costs of taxation as value-added taxes are one of the least distortionary taxes.
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Figure 7. VAT registration threshold (2012, US$)
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Asian Development Bank, OECD, authors’ calculations.
Note: Average exchange rates for 2000–10 are used.
*Unweighted average, data are for 2011.
Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic; OECD Organization of Economic Co-operation for Development; PRC People’s
Republic of China; VAT value-added tax.
The economic costs of value-added taxes are lower because, typically, VAT is
charged at a uniform, relatively low rate to a (more or less) comprehensive and
broad base. This reduces the economic costs of taxation, which tend to increase with
higher tax rates and narrower tax bases. Moreover, value-added taxes, in theory, do
not distort business or export decisions. This is because the tax paid on production
inputs and exports is deductible. Also, value-added taxes are less distortionary than
other taxes because they do not affect savings and investment decisions—that is,
they do not distort choices between current and future consumption.
4.3 Tax administration and compliance costs
Limited information is available on tax administration costs in Asian countries.
Figure 8 plots tax administration expenditure as a percent of GDP for six Asian
countries (India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore)
and the OECD economies. It shows that administration costs in Asia are relatively
low, at least in the countries for which data are available. This is partly because of
less revenue collection. Also contributing to the low tax administration expenditure
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Figure 8. Tax administration expenditure (2009, percent of GDP)
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Note: GDP gross domestic product.
*Data are for 2007.
in Indonesia, India, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore is an efªcient tax adminis-
tration. This can be seen in Figure 9, which compares the administrative costs of col-
lecting 100 units of revenue. Indonesia has the 7th lowest costs, India the 10th low-
est, whereas Singapore and the Republic of Korea rank 13th and 14th, respectively.
The ease with which taxpayers are able to comply with the tax system also varies
across countries. Figure 10 plots the total time to comply with taxes in hours per
year. Compliance costs in Asia are lowest in the Maldives (largely because in 2009
the Maldives did not levy taxes on goods and services or income taxes other than on
the net proªt of banks based on their annual ªnancial statements); Hong Kong,
China; and Singapore. They are highest in the PRC, Pakistan, and Vietnam, partly
because of complicated tax systems in these countries.
Complicated tax systems increase tax administration and compliance costs as well
as the opportunity for tax planning and tax avoidance. Moreover, narrow-base,
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Figure 9. Tax administration costs to net revenue collections (2009, costs per 100 units
of revenue)
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Note: *Data are for 2004.
**Data are for 2007.
high-rate tax systems are often seen as unfair because higher-income taxpayers gen-
erally have greater scope and resources to shift income to avoid higher tax rates. Un-
fair tax systems can reduce individuals’ and businesses’ willingness to pay taxes and
hence the government’s ability to raise ªnancing to fund government expenditure.
4.4 Government expenditure policies
Turning to government expenditures, Asia has made considerable progress in im-
proving education and health outcomes and toward achieving the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs).8 The second MDG focuses on education (achieving uni-
versal primary education) and goals 4–6 center on health (reducing child mortality;
improving maternal health; and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases).
Progress in Asian countries has been substantial, particularly in education.
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8 The MDGs were adopted by world leaders in September 2000 to reduce extreme poverty
with a deadline of achieving a series of targets by 2015.
Figure 10. Total time to comply with taxes (2012, hours per year)
Source: World Bank
Note: Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic; OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development;
PRC People’s Republic of China.
*Unweighted average.
Primary school enrollment and the number of students who start ªrst grade and
reach the last grade of primary education have been rising, and several countries
have achieved or are expected to reach the set goals by 2015. Moreover, literacy rates
in Asia are high. Most Asian countries have rates that are above the world average,
and those economies with rates below (Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, the Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, and Pakistan) have made considerable progress
to raise them. These achievements are likely to be a contributing factor in the ªnd-
ing that education expenditure is reducing income inequality in Asia as government
spending on primary education has been found to be progressive.
Progress has also been made toward improving health conditions. Maternal death
rates have fallen sharply in Asia, with better attendance at birth of trained health
professionals and improved antenatal care. Infant and child mortality rates are also
falling, although only a few countries so far have reached the MDG target. The
progress that has been made is likely to have beneªtted poor families in particular,
as infant and child mortality is closely related to household wealth. Infants in poor
households are often less than half as likely to survive their ªrst year of life as those
in higher-wealth households (ADB 2011). Death and incidence rates of tuberculosis
have also been declining. But HIV/AIDS remains a problem, with the percentage of
the population with comprehensive, correct knowledge about the illness and the
percentage of the population with advanced HIV infection who have access to anti-
retroviral drugs both being relatively low and only rising slowly in some countries
from a low base.
For social protection, overall coverage remains relatively low in Asia and generally
only available to formal sector workers in the civil service or large enterprises.
Moreover, the availability of social protection programs does not necessarily imply
that they are well designed or have wide coverage. Few countries have income sup-
port systems for the unemployed (e.g., the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Re-
public of Korea; Mongolia; Thailand; and Vietnam) with coverage rates in terms of
the proportion of unemployed who receive beneªts being less than 10 percent on
average (ILO 2010). Effective coverage of work-related accidents and diseases is also
low with only a proportion of accidents being reported and compensated. In the in-
formal sector, unemployment coverage is virtually nonexistent, working conditions
and safety are typically poor, and work-related diseases are widespread.
With regard to income security in old age, although some Asian countries have
made efforts to extend coverage beyond the formal sector, the proportion of the
working-age population covered by contributory programs remains low at around
20 percent (ILO 2010), and few countries have social pensions to provide safety net
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retirement income for people who were not members of a formal scheme. Moreover,
pension systems in Asian countries, outside the OECD, are often quite generous due
to early retirement ages and relatively high pension levels (OECD 2012). According
to OECD estimates, replacement rates, which measure the value of a person’s pen-
sion as the percentage of their earnings when working, are well above OECD levels
for men in Asia, especially in the PRC, Pakistan, and Vietnam. The high replacement
rates are partly due to nearly all deªned-beneªt schemes being based on ªnal sala-
ries rather than average earnings. Such schemes tend to be particularly regressive
because the higher paid typically have salaries that rise more rapidly with age,
whereas the earnings of lower paid workers generally remain ºat or rise less fast.
Furthermore, the OECD estimates that the expected amount of time that people
spend in retirement, which can be calculated by combining information on national
pension ages and life expectancy, is relatively high in Asia. Pension eligibility ages
are particularly low for both men and women in Malaysia and Sri Lanka and for
women in the PRC and Thailand.
This discussion offers some potential explanation for the ªnding that education and
health expenditures in Asia have reduced income inequality, whereas social security
spending has mainly beneªtted those with a higher income. Basic education and
health services seem to be fairly universally available, whereas social protection
spending has been restricted to those already likely to be better off (i.e., people em-
ployed in the formal sector). This suggests that labor market reform that moves
workers from informal to formal employment may offer the greatest scope for re-
ducing income inequality in Asia. Higher formal employment should also raise per-
sonal income tax collection, which could further assist governments in achieving
redistributive objectives.
5. Conclusions and policy lessons
This paper assessed the impact of government ªscal policies on income inequality in
Asia. It discussed the role and effectiveness of redistributive ªscal policies and pro-
vided estimates of the effects of taxation and government expenditure on income
distributions in Asia and other countries.
Government expenditures on health and education have reduced income inequality
both in Asia and the rest of the world, but public spending on social protection
shows a distinctive differential distributive impact. Social protection expenditure in
Asia appears to increase income inequality, whereas it reduces it in the rest of the
world. Also adversely affecting the distribution of income in Asian countries is gov-
ernment expenditure on housing.
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For taxation, policies in Asia have a less distinctive differential distributive impact.
Empirical estimates provide some evidence that personal income taxes are more
progressive in Asia than in the rest of the world, possibly because of a larger num-
ber of people not paying income tax. Corporate income taxes, on the other hand,
may be less progressive. This could be due to larger tax incentives, exemptions, and
concessions for Asian ªrms.
Although taxes by themselves are less effective in redistributing income, taxation is
crucial to raise ªnancing for government expenditure to achieve distributional ob-
jectives through spending programs on social welfare and the social sectors, such as
health and education policies. The discussion in this paper suggests that taxes could
be raised more efªciently in some Asian countries. Practically speaking, an efªcient
tax system is one that reduces the disincentive effects of taxation to work, save, and
invest by using broad bases and low, fairly uniform rates. A broad-base, low-rate
system also reduces administration and compliance costs and is often seen as effec-
tively more fair than a narrow-base system because of horizontal equity consider-
ations (taxpayers who have the same income should pay the same amount in taxes)
and vertical equity concerns (people with different incomes should pay different
amounts of tax).
The tax systems in several Asian countries are characterized by relatively high tax
rates and narrow bases. Moreover, there seems to be greater reliance on corporate
income taxation, which tends to be more distortionary (because of internationally
mobile capital) than personal income taxation and VAT. Tax reform in Asia could fo-
cus on lowering income tax rates while broadening the tax base (i.e., abolishing tax
incentives, exemptions, and concessions). This would reduce the economic, compli-
ance, and administrative costs of taxation and likely lead to increases in tax revenue.
Increases in tax revenue, in turn, would allow greater government expenditure to
achieve distributional objectives. Further gains could be achieved in some countries
by shifting the tax burden from income taxation to VAT and broadening the VAT
base. Currently, VAT exemptions and/or reduced tax rates for necessities are often
used to address the potential regressivity of VAT. These are costly, however, and not
well targeted to the poor. A more effective policy would be direct cash transfer pay-
ments to those in need.
With respect to government spending policies, Asia has made considerable progress
in improving education and health outcomes. Social protection policies generally re-
main limited in Asia, however, and in countries where they exist they tend to have a
narrow beneªt coverage and lack targeting to the poor. For instance, unemployment
beneªts are typically restricted to those in formal employment and do not include
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the large proportion of those working in the informal sector. Pensions are another
example. In Asian countries, outside the OECD, pension systems are often quite
generous due to early retirement ages and relatively high pension levels, but they
are typically only available to a privileged minority.
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Appendix A. Taxation and income inequality in Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini1 0.071*** 0.078* 0.159*** 0.005 0.020 0.273*** 0.029*
(0.009) (0.043) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017)
Net 4.257*** 3.558** 4.768*** 3.073** 5.771*** 6.079*** 3.691*
(0.494) (1.517) (0.676) (1.217) (1.794) (0.588) (1.950)
Gross 3.829*** 6.633*** 3.863*** 3.580** 5.091*** 7.178*** 3.981**
(0.557) (1.766) (0.741) (1.522) (1.587) (0.821) (1.713)
Population growth 0.084 0.269 0.139 0.351** 0.051 0.063 0.178**
(0.060) (0.466) (0.125) (0.179) (0.179) (0.081) (0.077)
Youth dependency 0.015 0.114** 0.076*** 0.027 0.041** 0.075*** 0.017
(0.022) (0.044) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.024)
Old-age dependency 0.197** 0.360 0.238* 0.290** 0.512*** 0.278*** 0.511***
(0.079) (0.270) (0.126) (0.138) (0.178) (0.062) (0.119)
Schooling 0.481*** 0.094 0.494*** 0.208** 0.675*** 0.528*** 0.395***
(0.028) (0.125) (0.064) (0.081) (0.105) (0.059) (0.070)
Unemployment 0.093*** 0.069** 0.067*** 0.105*** 0.139*** 0.089*** 0.097***
(0.010) (0.029) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012)
GDP per capita 2.410*** 1.046 0.671 0.860 3.025*** 0.017 4.462***
(0.710) (1.800) (1.095) (1.014) (0.838) (0.409) (0.942)
(GDP per cap)^2 0.192*** 0.108 0.048 0.083 0.242*** 0.072* 0.335***
(0.074) (0.198) (0.123) (0.102) (0.079) (0.043) (0.085)
Globalization 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.078*** 0.103*** 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.102***
(0.007) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Corruption 0.405*** 0.013 0.306*** 0.395*** 0.328*** 0.172*** 0.348***
(0.028) (0.068) (0.020) (0.057) (0.043) (0.037) (0.030)
Inºation 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.033** 0.069*** 0.101*** 0.079*** 0.068***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012)
Total revenues 0.015 0.040** 0.014 0.046*** 0.113*** 0.000 0.053***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013)
PIT 0.041
(0.105)
PIT*Asia 0.532**
(0.222)
PIT*Progress 0.005***
(0.000)
PIT*Progress*Asia 0.003
(0.011)
CIT 0.338*
(0.193)
CIT*Asia 0.936**
(0.394)
CIT*Globalization 0.005**
(0.003)
CIT*Globalization*Asia 0.022***
(0.007)
SSCPayroll 0.165
(0.145)
SSCPayroll*Asia 1.159
(0.919)
GTGS 0.768***
(0.134)
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Appendix A. (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GTGS*Asia 0.102
(0.313)
Excises 0.059
(0.042)
Excises*Asia 0.668***
(0.228)
Customs 0.651***
(0.165)
Customs*Asia 0.477
(0.575)
Constant 33.404*** 22.215*** 30.954*** 31.699*** 29.774*** 25.715*** 34.261***
(1.296) (4.094) (2.440) (2.747) (3.144) (1.556) (1.831)
Number of observations 907 539 822 844 879 804 842
Number of countries 77 53 74 72 76 70 73
Sargan (p-value) 0.785 0.741 0.799 0.789 0.810 0.863 0.885
AR2 (p-value) 0.374 0.349 0.344 0.344 0.418 0.235 0.319
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p 0.01. **p 0.05. *p 0.1.
For Asian countries the marginal effect of a variable is equal to the estimated coefªcient of the variable plus the estimated coefªcient of
the variable interacted with the dummy variable that equals one if the country is in Asia and zero otherwise.
Appendix B. Government expenditures and income inequality in Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini-1 0.102*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.158***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.026)
Net 7.155*** 5.902*** 0.021 6.192***
(1.991) (1.411) (2.340) (1.348)
Gross 6.249*** 3.087** 1.404 4.657***
(2.298) (1.483) (2.213) (1.336)
Population growth 0.038 0.430** 0.510*** 2.419***
(0.232) (0.170) (0.191) (0.648)
Youth dependency 0.027 0.035 0.042 0.141***
(0.040) (0.060) (0.038) (0.037)
Old-age dependency 0.244 0.678 0.473** 0.436
(0.154) (0.440) (0.188) (0.286)
Schooling 0.135 0.393*** 0.512*** 0.189
(0.174) (0.121) (0.144) (0.172)
Unemployment 0.123*** 0.076*** 0.119*** 0.109***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021)
GDP per capita 2.190 1.562 3.186*** 0.106
(1.540) (1.705) (0.973) (1.605)
(GDP per cap)^2 0.282 0.177 0.288*** 0.150
(0.182) (0.152) (0.102) (0.135)
Globalization 0.080*** 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.239***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Corruption 0.116 0.133 0.211** 0.274**
(0.113) (0.112) (0.105) (0.128)
Inºation 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.068*** 0.003
(0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
Total revenues 0.053** 0.052** 0.000 0.019
(0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.018)
Social protection 0.276***
(0.058)
Social protection*Asia 0.766
(0.591)
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